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Abstract—Data storage is one of the main computing issues
of this century. Not only storage devices are converging to strict
physical limits, but also the amount of data generated by users
is growing at an unbelievable rate. To face these challenges, data
centres grew constantly over the past decades. However, this
growth comes with a price, particularly from the environmental
point of view. Among various promising media, DNA is one
of the most fascinating candidate. In our previous work, we
have proposed an automated archival architecture which uses
bioengineered bacteria to store and retrieve data, previously
encoded into DNA. This storage technique is one example of
how biological media can deliver power-efficient storing solutions.
The similarities between these biological media and classical ones
can also be a drawback, as malicious parties might replicate
traditional attacks on the former archival system, using biological
instruments and techniques.
In this paper, first we analyse the main characteristics of
our storage system and the different types of attacks that
could be executed on it. Then, aiming at identifying on-going
attacks, we propose and evaluate detection techniques, which
rely on traditional metrics and machine learning algorithms.
We identify and adapt two suitable metrics for this purpose,
namely generalized entropy and information distance. Moreover,
our trained models achieve an AUROC over 0.99 and AUPRC
over 0.91.
Index Terms—DNA encoding, storage system, DoS, metrics,
machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
THE World Wide Web [1] has transformed the way hu-man beings create and share information, breaking down
cultural barriers. Emerging communication technologies (e.g.,
5G and Internet of Things) enabled seamless connectivity
and novel applications. For example, social networks allow
people to share their experience through messages, pictures,
audio, and video recordings. As a consequence, we face an
increasingly amount of data, bound to further grow as more
and more devices will connect to the Internet in the future.
Currently all these generated data are stored in large data
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centres, resulting in large investments in cloud services and
infrastructures [2].
While these infrastructures are necessary and inevitable,
they also bring along some challenges. Data centres consume
phenomenal amounts of energy and heavily impact the envi-
ronment [3] [4]. Besides, the energy required for powering
and cooling the data centres place immense strain on the
operation costs. Driven by these challenges, researchers have
been exploring alternative storage mediums.
An emerging and promising approach is to store data into
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). From a computing perspec-
tive, DNA represents biological cells’ software and determines
organisms’ functionalities. This software enables different
types of cells to operate as a collective system, such as
tissues and organs. This key characteristic allows us to use
cells as data storage units, where information is encoded into
nucleotides and inserted in the DNA. There have been many
proposed techniques for encoding information into genetic
sequences. For example, Goldman et al. [5] developed a simple
2-bit encoding scheme, capable of storing a large quantity
of data into DNA strands. A major question is the future
practicality of DNA storage, and how we could integrate it in
conventional data centres. Since we are dealing with biological
substrates, we have to be aware of attacks that use either
organisms or chemicals. The complication increases with bio-
logical systems equipped with random access functionalities.
An example for random access was proposed by researchers
from University of Washington and Microsoft [6]. In their
work, the authors proposed multiple pools of DNA storage,
where each DNA strand corresponds to binary data. To support
random access capabilities, every strand has a primer (i.e., a
specific sequence of nucleotides used as a starting point for
DNA synthesis). Tavella et al. [7] proposed to store informa-
tion within bioengineered bacteria [8] [9] [10], and retrieve
it through a bacterial nanonetwork. Bacterial nanonetworks
are artificial networks that exhibit molecular communication
characteristics, and enable multi-hop links between motile and
non-motile bacteria.
In this paper, we focus on the security implications of
Tavella et al. [7] approach, where digital information is
encoded into DNA plasmids, which are physically stored
inside bacteria. In particular, bacteria are known to interact
and communicate as part of their social ecosystem, both
intraspecies and interspecies. Communication is critical for
bacteria to survive collectively as a population and evolve
through different environmental changes. When information is
stored in bacteria, population interference can occur from other
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2bacteria living within the same environment. Such interference
need to be monitored in order to ensure that the retrieval pro-
cess maintains an acceptable level of reliability. Giaretta el al.
[11] presented how security can affect bacterial nanonetworks,
by blocking or deviating the movement of motile bacteria
towards an intended location.
In Figure I, we present an architecture where bacterial
nanonetworks can be integrated into conventional data centres.
The bacterial storage can be located in data centres, or can
be part of a remote device owned by the end user, such as
an Internet of Things (IoT) device. Research showed that
current IoT devices are susceptible to security attacks [12],
making them unfit candidates for holding complex entities like
bacterial networks. Moreover, IoT devices generally lack in
computational power, increasing the challenge in deploying
monitoring algorithms to detect security attacks. Data centres
are better candidates for integrating a biological infrastructure.
First, they exhibit isolation which allows them to safely host a
DNA storage system based on bacterial nanonetworks. Second,
they have access to enough computational power for storing
and running monitoring algorithms.
DNA-Based Datacenter Traditional Datacenter
Cloud Layer
Local Layer
Libraries of Encoded Information
Motile Bacteria for Picking-up Information
DNA-based Client
DNA-based Client
Electronic Client
DNA-based Client
Router
Fog Node
Router
Electronic Client
Figure 1. Architecture of a mixed network, where traditional electronic
devices and servers co-exist with DNA-based devices.
In our study, we investigate two types of algorithm for
detecting attacks on the bacterial nanonetwork DNA storage.
We use information metrics, previously used for detecting
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in conventional
networks [13], and we use Machine Learning (ML) techniques.
The contributions of this paper are manifold:
1) An analysis of bacterial nanonetwork DNA storage sys-
tem from a computer science perspective, highlighting
similarities and differences with conventional storages;
2) A security attack that uses competing bacteria to disrupt
the bacterial nanonetwork infrastructure;
3) Information metric techniques reformuled for detecting
DDoS attacks in conventional networks, together with an
assessment of such techniques for bacterial nanonetwork
storages;
4) Machine learning algorithms for monitoring bacterial
nanonetworks and detecting attacks;
5) A thorough evaluation of all the presented techniques
through extensive simulations.
We organize this paper as follows: Section II describes
the DNA automated archive and the different attacks that a
malicious user could execute into it. Section III describes
traditional metrics for detecting DDoS attacks and how we can
adapt them to our scenario. Section IV explains how machine
learning can be used for the same purpose. In Section V we
assess the attacks dangerousness, as well as the effectiveness
of our detection techniques. Last, in Section VI we discuss
our results and draw our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the functioning of bacteria-based
DNA-based storage devices and the corresponding attacks that
can be lead onto these systems.
A. DNA storage
The DNA automated archive [7] is a biological storage sys-
tem that combines two different components: DNA encoding
and bioengineered bacteria. The first component provides a
way for transferring and translating digital information into
DNA, while the bacteria are used as data storage and access
mechanism. Figure 2 describes the overall system architecture
of the system proposed in [7]. Digital information is firstly
encoded into nucleotides, and for this the authors use different
encoding techniques. The synthesized genes of the encoded
nucleotides are inserted into plasmids, and plasmids are in-
serted into bacteria through the transformation process. To en-
sure motility restriction, these bacteria are place on solid agar
(i.e., a jelly-like substance used to measure microorganisms’
ability to move). The motility-restricted bacteria with different
data are placed into specific regions of the grid, as illustrated
in Figure 2. In the event that a read operation needs to be
performed, motile bacteria are released from A, swim towards
the compartment, and then conjugate with the motile-restricted
bacteria to retrieve the plasmids with the encoded information.
Once this is complete, bacteria swim towards position C to
deliver the plasmids. Conjugation is a process where bacteria
come together and form a physical connection that allows them
to transfer plasmids between each other, and this process has
a probability associated with it. At position C, the plasmids
are retrieved, sequenced to obtain the data, and decoded back
into digital format.
A key requirement for the motile bacteria is the capability of
swimming towards an accurate point. This allows to conjugate
with the correct batch of motile-restricted bacteria, and retrieve
the right plasmid with the encoded information. This is where
the proposed Molecular Positioning System (MPS) [7] plays
a role. As suggested by Okaie et al. [10], it is possible to
deploy chemoattractants and redirect engineered-bacteria by
3Figure 2. Overall system architecture of the DNA archival system that
enables reading using bacterial nanonetworks. Motile bacteria (in grey) swim
from the source towards each of the library points, which contain different
information. Reached the motile-restricted bacteria, conjugation starts to
retrieve the encoded information contained into the plasmid. Last step, motile
bacteria swim towards the Target, where the plasmid is retrieved through
sequencing processes.
means of chemotaxis (i.e., movement as a response to chemical
stimuli). This pairs well with MPS [7], which is based on the
receptor saturation addressing technique, proposed by Moore
and Nakano [8] [9].
B. Vulnerabilities
Regardless of the fact that it is based on bacterial nanonet-
works, the DNA archive [7] is, to many extents, similar to
electronic storage systems. Therefore, it is prone to most of
the common databases attacks. Here, we propose two examples
of these attacks: Denial of Service (DoS) and sniffing.
1) Denial of Service: In order to share DNA, bacteria
use a method called conjugation. During this process, two
bacteria physically connect to each other to share plasmids
(i.e., circular DNA strands). However, each bacterium can
conjugate only with one bacterium. Thus, if attackers spread
their own bacteria around the clusters area, the bacteria con-
jugate with the set of bacteria that contain the encoded data,
as Figure 3 illustrates. Malicious bacteria move from point C
to the cluster, cluttering the system, and after completing the
conjugation process reach point D. In this way, the legitimate
bacteria that are meant to retrieve the DNA are not able to
conjugate and access the information in the archive. This
equals to a DoS attack on a database, since it prevents the main
feature of the archive, retrieving stored data. Besides blocking
and cluttering the clusters of motile bacteria, the cluttering can
also occur at the destination where the bacteria are collected
before they are pulled into the sequencer.
2) Sniffing: To extract data from the biological storage
system, the bacteria need to pick-up the data contained in
the clusters and to reach the machine that performs DNA
sequencing. During the trip from the archives to the sequencer,
an attacker could place a swarm of bacteria in the middle. This
would cause the bacteria to conjugate with the ones carrying
A B
Chemoattractant
beacons
Chemoattractant
gradient
C
D
Figure 3. Example of DoS scenario. Legitimate bacteria move from starting
point A to the agars containing the storage bacteria. Once the conjugation
is complete, they move towards their destination B. Malicious bacteria move
from C to D trying to conjugate with the ones in the agar, blocking the retrival
process of the legitimate bacteria.
the encoded information. Consequently, the malicious user can
obtain the encoded information without accessing the machine
connected to the DNA sequencer. In a network scenario, it
would be the equivalent of listening on a channel and sniffing
packets.
III. DOS INFORMATION METRICS
One way to evaluate an experiment is to define a metric,
a standard for measuring a particular characteristic of the
experiment. For example, in the field of cybersecurity it is
important to measure the damage that an attack (e.g., a DoS)
can produce to an infrastructure, or the robustness of the
infrastructure in general. Each metric is strictly correlated to
what it measures. Therefore, the same metric can perform
differently based on the scenario in which it is applied.
It is possible for an attacker to elude detection metrics. For
example, if we perform a DoS attack and we do not want to be
tracked, we can use multiple machines to conduct the attack.
By distributing the outgoing traffic over different IPs we make
it harder for the victim to trace us, achieving a Distributed DoS
(DDoS). Another way of eluding DoS detection metrics is to
maintain a low-rate of traffic sent by the malicious computers,
so that it negatively affects the service without exceeding the
warning threshold.
Therefore, we need a tool that can overcome similar sce-
narios. Xiang et al. [13] developed an algorithm based on
statistical methods to detect a low-rate DDoS attack and
traceback the IP of the attacker. Given a Local Area Network
(LAN) and a supervisor that monitors the network traffic, their
algorithm is based on the following assumptions:
1) the supervisor has full control of all the routers;
2) they extracted an effective feature (e.g., IP addresses) of
network traffic to sample its probability;
43) the supervisor obtained and stored the average traffic of
the normal, as well as the local thresholds σfi and σf(Ri)
on its own routers in advance;
4) on all routers, the traffic follows Poisson distribution and
the normal traffic follows a Gaussian noise distribution.
As stated by Xiang et al. [13], it is widely accepted that
the Poisson distribution function can simulate the DDoS
attack traffic in aggregation and the fractional Gaussian
noise function can be simulate real network traffic in
aggregation.
The authors redefine two metrics commonly used in infor-
mation theory: generalized entropy and information distance.
Generalized entropy is a measure of uncertainty associated
with a random variable. The more random the information,
the bigger the entropy; viceversa, the greater the certainty
related to the information, the smaller the entropy. Given a set
of events {x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn}, their associated probabilities
p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn and the following property:
0 ≤ pi ≤ ∀i = 1 . . . n,
n∑
i=1
pi = 1, (1)
the generalized entropy is defined as follows:
Hα(x) =
1
1− αlog2
(
n∑
i=1
pαi
)
, α 6= 0, (2)
where α is the order of the entropy. When α → 1, the
formula converges to the Shannon entropy:
H1(x) = −
n∑
i=1
pilog2pi. (3)
One of the most important properties of the generalized
entropy is that, given α > 1, it increases the deviation
between the different probability distributions, compared to
the Shannon entropy [14] [15]. A high probability event
contributes more to the final entropy than to the Shannon
entropy when α > 1, and a low probability event contributes
more when α < 1. Consequently, we can obtain different
entropy values based on the different values of α.
Finally, the information distance measures the diver-
gence between two probability distributions. Let P =
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) and Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) be two discrete
complete probability distribution with the same properties
described in Equation 1. The information distance can be
calculated as:
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 log2
(
n∑
i=1
pαi q
1−α
i
)
, α ≥ 0. (4)
Note that Dα(P ||Q) 6= Dα(Q||P ). In other terms, the
information distance is not symmetric. Based on the value
of α, one of the two distributions (i.e., the one to the power
(1−α)) may not be able to contain events where the associated
probability is equal to 0. The authors define such distribution
as continuous. For α → 1, the information distance becomes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence:
D1(P ||Q) =
n∑
i=1
pilog2
(
pi
qi
)
. (5)
In [13], Xiang and colleagues modified the information dis-
tance equation to satisfy a few properties (namely, additivity,
asymmetry and incresing function of α) in order to make it
compliant to the formal definition of metric. The final result
is given in Equation 6:
Dα(P,Q) = Dα(P ||Q) +Dα(Q||P ) =
1
α− 1 log2
(
n∑
i=1
pαi q
1−α
i ·
n∑
i=1
qαi p
1−α
i
)
. (6)
In this case, none of the two probability distributions can
contain events with an associated probability equals to zero.
In the end, Xiang et al. used the information distance metric
to develop a collaborative DDoS attack detection algorithm,
which can be found in [13].
A. Metrics as detection mean
Generalized entropy and information distance are based on
probability distributions of values, while in our case we have
a distribution of value over time. However, a distribution over
time can be converted to an approximation of a probability
distribution. In fact, given the initial number of bacteria Ni and
the total simulation time T , we can calculate the probability
of observing a certain number of bacteria b as:
P (x = b) =
∑T
t=0B(t) = b
Ni
, (7)
where B(t) is the number of bacteria counted at time t and:
(B(t) = b) =
{
1 if there are b bacteria at time t,
0 otherwise.
(8)
The main idea is to use the two metrics to detect if an
attack on our archive is taking place. Intuitively, the traffic
(i.e., the number of bacteria and how they are distributed over
time) is different whether the system is functioning normally
or it is under attack. As a result, we define the Algorithm 1
to convert the time sequence into a (sample of) probability
distribution. The reason behind this pre-processing is that we
wait for bacteria to swim towards their destination, which can
take a long time. By defining a long period of time T , we can
assume a stable mean of bacteria that reach their destination. In
this way, we can use the generalized entropy and information
distance in our scenario.
As long as the sum of these probabilities is not zero, we
can calculate the entropy and measure its changes due to an
intrusion in the archive. Based on the definition, generalized
entropy gives more relevance to rare events: the less likely
an event, the bigger the entropy. This implies that when we
have a really low number (e.g., 10) of outgoing “packets”
(i.e., bacteria reaching the destination area) and we lose one
of them, the event becomes very frequent (1/10 = 10%) and
5Algorithm 1: Converting a time series to an approximation
of a probability distribution.
Input: Ni number of bacteria, D array of distribution
over time.
Output: P array of probabilities.
v ← 0;
while v ≤ Ni do
P (v)← countV alueInArray(v,D);
v ← v + 1;
end
P ← divideElementWise(P, length(D));
the generalized entropy is less relevant compared to a scenario
where we have a loss of 1 packet over 150 (1/150 = 0.66%).
Nevertheless, we need to make some changes in order to use
the generalized distance. One of the main assumption made by
Xiang et al. [13] is that the probability distributions involved
in the calculation must be continuous. This is not our case,
because it is very likely that two different data extractions lead
to two different time series of bacteria, due to the randomness
in bacteria movement. As a result, it may happens that a certain
value never appears in one series, while it does in other series.
There are two possible way of adapting the metric to our
case: using dummy values and transforming the distributions
to make them continuous. The usage of dummy values implies
substituting each 0 that make the distribution non-continuous
with a fixed value (e.g., 10−3). However, the insertion of
a low number would change significantly the value of the
metric; on the contrary, a high number would invalidate the
fact that the sum of all probabilities is equal to 1. Thus,
truncating the distributions in order to make them continu-
ous is a better option. Let us suppose that our distribution
is composed of 4 values and their associated probabilities
{(v0, p0), (v1, p1), (v2, p2), (v3, p3)}. While it is true that the
removal of an event from the distribution (e.g., (v3, p3))
implies a loss of information, such a loss would not be so im-
pactful. Indeed, the information that a specific event contains is
also partially contained in other events: for example, we know
that p3 = 1 −
∑2
i=0 pi. Algorithm 2 describes how, given
two probability distributions, we can make them continuous
according to Xiang et al.’s [13] definition.
In this way, we can use the distance metric to measure the
divergence by comparing two different scenarios. This implies
that the distance metric is a better way of measuring the diver-
sity of two events, because it compares them directly, while
the generalized entropy compares their respective values.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING FOR DETECTION
Despite the appropriateness of a metric, in most cases
its mathematical development requires time and resources
from researchers. An automated approach would be better in
terms of efficiency and efficacy, given that it could extract
abnormalities from the data and automatically adapt to new
scenarios.
In the cybersecurity field, one of the main tools re-
cently used for detection algorithms is machine learning
Algorithm 2: Converting two probability distributions into
two continuous probability distributions.
Input: P and Q, arrays of probabilities.
Output: Pc and Qc, arrays of continuous probabilities.
Pc,Qc← emptyArray();
len← min(length(P ), length(Q));
i← 0;
while i < len do
if P (i) 6= 0 and Q(i) 6= 0 then
Pc← append(Pc, P (i));
Qc← append(Qc,Q(i));
end
i← i+ 1;
end
(ML) [16] [17]. For example, ML is used for intrusion detec-
tion [18], as well for DoS [19] and DDoS detection [20] [21].
By using a learning approach, we do not need to develop a
different metric for each kind of attack. Instead, we can give
a lot of examples (i.e., behaviour of the system under normal
circumstances and under attack) to a machine learning algo-
rithm, allowing it to learn to distinguish different scenarios.
Moreover, if the algorithm has been trained enough, we could
potentially reuse it for different kind of attacks.
Machine learning is usually divided in two main cat-
egories: supervised and unsupervised learning. In super-
vised learning, we have a set composed of examples tuples
{(x0, y0), (x1, y1), · · · (xn, yn)} where xi is the feature of the
example, and yi is its label (i.e., an assigned category). Usu-
ally, the task of a supervised learning algorithm is to minimize
the error related to a function that involves these examples,
in order to be able to predict categories (classification) or
values (regression). On the other hand, unsupervised learning
does not require any category, and the categorization is based
upon similarities among the features. Ideally, unsupervised
learning algorithms learn to categorize the example without
any external support. However, in some cases it is really
hard to distinguish similar examples without any indications,
because features can be really similar even when they indicate
different classes. Moreover, given the pace of virtual simula-
tions, we can generate samples to train the algorithm without
the necessity of observing a real system being attacked.
In our case, we can obtain two different information from
our simulations: the distribution of bacteria over time, and
the probability of observing a specific amount of bacteria
over the whole simulation. In addition, we also know the
number of bacteria used to retrieve the data and the number
of malicious bacteria. Consequently, we define three different
types of features that we will feed to our algorithm: (i) the
number of bacteria that were able to reach their destination in
an interval between two sampling periods, (ii) the cumulative
number of bacteria that reached their destination up to a
specific moment, and (iii) a sample of probability distribution,
as described in Section III-A. From now on, we will refer to
these features with the names of “count”, “sum” and “sample”.
Using this data, our goal is to train a machine learning
6algorithms (e.g., Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine,
or Neural Networks) capable of distinguishing benevolent and
malicious traffic in our system during a DoS attack.
In the following sections, we walk through the steps for
pre-processing the data, selecting and evaluating the model,
and predicting the results.
A. Pre-processing
One of the most important ML phases is data pre-
processing. Usually, it is composed of four steps: (a) cleaning:
detecting, removing, and correcting corrupt data; (b) integra-
tion: merging in a proper way different kind of data, in order
to obtain a unique data set; (c) transformation: changing data
values to meet some requirements (e.g., we want features with
a specific average and standard deviation), or removing noise;
(d) reduction: removing from the data set entries that are
useless/redundant.
In our case, we do not need to go through the integration,
but we need to address the other three points. Given the
different numbers of legitimate bacteria for the simulations,
we obtain different probability distributions from Algorithm 1.
For a scenario that has a lower number of bacteria than other
cases, we do not calculate the probability for the same range of
values. For example, if a scenario has nmax1 = 50 bacteria and
the other scenario has nmax2 = 100, the probability distribution
for the first one does not include the probabilities for values
greater than 50. Consequently, we need to fill in the missing
probability values with zeros. In addition, we normalize all the
features so that they follow a normal distribution N(0, 1). As
we described in Algorithm 2, we also remove all the columns
that contain zero in all the entries, both from the left and the
right side of the data set, in the same way trimming a string
would remove the whitespaces at the beginning and at the end
of it.
B. Model selection
Different predictors have different characteristics. Some of
them produce poor results if they are fed with small data sets,
while others can perform good even with small data sets. Other
models are suited for binary classification (i.e., two possible
outcomes), while others can distinguish among more classes.
Therefore, we need to choose the best predictor for our specific
task.
Our main goal is to detect whether our system is under
attack or not. Consequently, we have to perform a binary
classification where 0 indicates under attack and 1 stands for
normal traffic. We test five different classifiers: Support Vector
Machine, Multi-layer Perceptron, Random Forest, K-Nearest
Neighbors, and Logistic Regression.
C. Metrics
As we previously mentioned, in order to measure the quality
of our choices and results, we need to define some metrics.
There are some metrics widely used in machine learning which
consider the capability of the predictor to produce correct
results. In binary classification, given an example (xi, yi)
and its predicted value y′i, there are four possible scenarios:
(i) True Positive (TP), where yi = y′i = 1; (ii) True Negative
(TN), yi = y′i = 0; (iii) False Positive (FP), yi = 0 and
y′i = 1; (iv) False Negative (FN), yi = 1 and y′i = 0.
From these four possible outcomes, we can define the
following metrics:
• Accuracy (α): TP+TNTP+FP+TN+FN ;
• Precision (pi): TPTP+FP ;
• Recall (ρ, also called Sensitivity or True Positive Rate):
TP
TP+FN ;
• F1 score: 2 piρpi+ρ ;
• Specificity (or True Negative Rate): TNTN+FP ;
• False Positive rate: 1− Specificity;
• AUC (Area Under Curve): the area under a curve that
represents the ratio between correct and wrong predic-
tions (e.g., precision-recall curve).
Accuracy is a general score describing how many guesses
from the predictor are correct, but it is not reliable in case of
unbalanced data sets. Sensitivity (i.e., recall) and specificity
indicate, respectively, the proportion of positives and negatives
that are correctly identified as such. Precision represents the
number of actual positives, among all the predicted positives.
The F1 score is a combination of precision and recall, which
also describe the accuracy of the predictor in case of an unbal-
anced dataset. Finally, the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve plots True Positive Rate (TPR) versus False
Positive Rate (FPR) at different discrimination thresholds -
i.e., a value used to determine whether to classify a sample
as one class or another. Thus, the ROC curve represents the
TPR as a function of the FPR. Similarly, the Precision-Recall
curve plots precision versus recall while varying the discrimi-
nation threshold - this particular curve is ideal for unbalanced
datasets. By calculatitng the Area Under Curve (AUC) for
these two different measures, we obtain an aggregate measure
of performance across all possible classification thresholds.
We define the AUC for ROC as AUROC and the AUC for
Precision-Recall curve as AUPRC.
D. Training and parameter tuning
Usually, before training a machine learning algorithm we
must divide the data set in three different subsets:
• training set: the part of the data used to train the
algorithm;
• validation set: the subset used to choose the model, and
tune its hyperparameters;
• test set: the data used to evaluate the efficacy of the
algorithm, after it has been trained.
In this way, we evaluate the algorithm with neutral data
that was not part of its training. Moreover, the division of
training and test set reduce the risk of overfitting, which is the
phenomenon of producing an analysing that corresponds too
closely to a specific data set. One further step for avoiding
overfitting is to use cross validation. In particular, k-fold cross
validation is a technique that splits the data into K chunks
of the same size, trains the model with K − 1 chunks, and
uses the remaining data as validation set. These steps are
7then repeated for each chunk. Cross validation helps both with
overfitting and parameter tuning, increasing the flexibility of
an evaluation.
In our case, we split our data sets using the 70% of it as
training (and validation) set, and the remaining 30% as test set.
We implement this division using the train_test_split
function from Scikit-learn machine learning library [22]. In
addition, we use the GridSearchCV class to execute an
exhaustive parameters search using cross validation. Table I
lists all the parameters that we investigate using the cross
validation method.
Table I
PARAMETERS INSPECTED DURING CROSS VALIDATION. THE PARAMETERS
NAME FOLLOWS THE NOMENCLATURE USED BY SCIKIT-LEARN [22]
Model Parameters
MLP hidden layer sizes, solver, learning rate
KNN n neighbors, weights, algorithm
SVM C, gamma, kernel, max iter
RF n estimators, max features
LR fit intercept
V. EVALUATIONS AND RESULTS
We defined different tools (i.e., metrics and machine learn-
ing algorithms) to detect if a malicious user is trying to
compromise a DNA-based archive. In this section, to assess
the quality of such tools, we run a number of simulations
that replicate the scenarios illustrated in Section II-B. Each
simulation represents one possible attack, demonstrating how
this vulnerability can affect the storage system. In the end,
we implement the different detection techniques described in
Section III and Section IV to verify their efficacy.
For each of the following simulations, the maximum amount
of bacteria contained in each cluster is 50, as mentioned by
Tavella et al. [7]. We conform to this parameter in order
to enable comparison between the data obtained during an
undisturbed run of the system and the following simulations.
If the bacteria are not able to retrieve the whole file within
120 virtual minutes (i.e., two hours in the simulation), we
stop the simulation. Finally, we indicate the intervals as tuples
[l, u, s] where l is the lower bound, u is the upper bound (both
included in the interval), and s is the step size. For example,
the tuple [10, 30, 10] indicates a range composed of the values
10, 20, and 30.
A. Attacks simulations
In this section, we describe the simulations we conducted
for evaluating the disruption of a DoS attack. In addition, we
define the dangerousness of an attack in terms of delay and
information loss, which is the incapability of retrieving data
within a fixed amount of time.
We have previously illustrated in Figure 3 how, during a
Denial of Service attack, malicious bacteria move towards the
clusters and conjugate with the bacteria containing the encoded
data, obstructing the legitimate bacteria. In our simulations,
we decided to vary the number of legitimate bacteria in the
range [10, 150, 10], according to the simulations conducted
in [7], and the number of malicious bacteria in the range
[0, 1900, 100]. Until the amount of legitimate and malicious
bacteria is lower than the total amount of bacteria in the
cluster, it is not possible to detect any kind of attack because
the cluster is not running at maximum conjugation rate.
However, since the conjugation has a probability approximated
by a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
1, it is not certain that we are able to detect any difference
even if the sum of the two types of bacteria is slightly greater
than the threshold.
Figure 4 shows how the percentage of retrieved file changes
with respect to the number of legitimate and malicious bacte-
ria. Even with a really high amount of attackers, it is sufficient
to use 150 retrievers to extract the whole file from the archive.
This shows that the percentage of retrieved file is not a good
measure to detect an attack. Figure 5 illustrates how the time
to retrieve the file is affected by the number of bacteria. In
this case, we can see how the number of attackers affects the
final time, increasing it from 40 minutes (150 retrievers vs. 0
attackers) to 100 minutes (150 retrievers vs. 1900 attackers).
In many cases, such as with attackers > 1000 and retrievers
< 100, the average time to retrieve the file gets really close
to the 120 minutes threshold.
Figure 4. Correlation among the number of engineered motile bacteria,
number of attackers and percentage of file retrieved. If the percentage is
lower than 100%, it means that the engineered motile bacteria were not able
to retrieve the whole file in less than 120 minutes.
In Section II-B2, we hypothesised that a malicious user
could steal a copy of the archived information, without being
noticed. From the results in Figure 4 and Figure 5, we can
deduce that an attacker could introduce a small number of
bacteria and obtain the archived data, while keeping the delay
low enough to avoid being detected.
B. Evaluation of information metrics
Before analysing the importance of the metric order α, let us
recall its role. Given a metric, such as the generalized entropy,
its order α increases/reduce the importance of an event. Let p
be the probability of an event, with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. If p 6= 1, there
are two different scenarios:
8Figure 5. Correlation among the number of engineered motile bacteria,
number of attackers and time necessary to retrieve the whole file. If the time
is greater or equal to 120 minutes, then the engineered motile bacteria were
not able to retrieve all the information.
1) if α > 1, then p > pα;
2) otherwise (α < 1), p < pα.
Consequently, whenever we impose the metric order below
1, we increase the value corresponding to the probability of an
event. With really small values of α, the closer the probability
is to 0, the bigger is the amplification. For example with α =
0.1 and p = 0.1, 0.10.1 − 0.1 ≈ 0.69, while with α = 0.1
and p = 0.5, 0.50.1 − 0.5 ≈ 0.43. In light of this, if we use
an order which is too small, we risk to flatten the diversity
between probabilities.
Here we present the most significant results; for the detailed
results, we refer the reader to Appendix A. We test four differ-
ent orders: 0.5, 2, 5, 10. We notice that there is no significant
difference in using α = 2, α = 5 or α = 10, so we decide to
remove 5 and 10 (i.e., the values that could cause unwanted
spikes in our curves)from the possible orders for the entropy.
Figure 6 shows how the metric changes with different numbers
of legitimate and malicious bacteria, for α = 2.
Through our experiments we also found out that α severely
affects the information distance. When the order is below 1,
it drastically flattens the differences. When the order is too
high (e.g., 10) the information distance lacks of monotonous
behaviour, presenting a lot of spikes over the curve. As
a consequence, we discard 0.5 and 10 as values for the
information distance. Figure 7 illustrates the behaviour of the
metric with order α = 2.
To summarize, we have two order values for the entropy
(0.5 and 2) and for the information distance (2 and 5) which
present different values for the respective metrics based on
whether the system is under attack or not.
Finally, our sampling frequency plays a major role in the
values of our metrics: a low sampling frequency can hide
the differences between distributions, while a high sampling
frequency is hard to implement from a technical point of view,
due to separation of bacteria and count. Therefore, we decide
to explore different scenarios where we gradually decrease the
Figure 6. Generalized entropy as a function of benevolent and malicious
bacteria. The sampling period is equal to 10 seconds and α = 2.
Figure 7. Information distance as a function of benevolent and malicious
bacteria. The sampling period is equal to 10 seconds and α = 2.
sampling frequency. Given 6 different sampling periods - 10,
20, 30, 60, 120, and 240 seconds - we observe in Figure 6
no significant variations for the generalized entropy. On the
other hand, the information distance is heavily affected by
the sampling period, changing its behaviour from detecting
changes in the number of malicious bacteria while using a
small sampling period (Figure 7) to detecting changes in the
number of legitimate ones while using a larger sampling period
(Figure 8).
C. Evaluation of Machine Learning
Here we describe in detail the results for binary classifica-
tion. For each metric, we discuss which are the best features
and models to use in order to obtain the best classificator.
Let us recall that the accuracy is defined as the ratio of
correct predictions over the whole set of predictions, It gives
us an idea about the efficacy of our predictor. However, if
one class cardinality is much larger than the other, correct
predictions over the majority class have a stronger influence
over the accuracy. Thus, we need to consider metrics that
9Figure 8. Impact of number of legitimate/malicious bacteria on information
distance with α = 2 and sampling period of 240 seconds. Compared to
Figure 7, the sampling period has a significant impact.
separates correct predictions for positive and negative samples,
such as sensitivity, specificity, and precision. Hence, we decide
to use the AUROC and the Area Under Precision-Recall curve
as a combination of the best metrics for our scenario.
Figure 9 shows how the correctness of our predictor is
affected by the different features and different sampling pe-
riods, using the Area under the ROC curve and Precision-
Recall curve. If we take into consideration only the AUROC
(Figure 9a), we can observe that varying sampling periods does
not drastically affect the score - i.e., low standard deviation.
The “sum” feature appears to be the best for all the classifiers.
Regarding the different classification algorithms, K-NN is the
one with the poorest performance and the highest standard
deviation. On the contrary, Random Forest is one of the best
algorithms across all the classifiers, with a negligible variance.
We can see that there is no feature that is capable of reducing
the standard deviation for all the algorithms simultaneously
and K-NN remains the algorithm that performs worse in most
of the scenarios. Even if we consider a different score, the
feature that brings most of the algorithms to the same level is
“sum”. In fact, the importance of using this feature is remarked
by Figures 19 to 21 in Appendix B.
Finally, given a sampling period of T = 10(s), Figures 16
to 18 and Figures 19 to 21 describe how every algorithm per-
forms over different features, using ROC curves and Precision-
Recall curves. In Figures 16 to 18 we notice that no algorithm,
except for K-Nearest Neighbors, scores an Area Under ROC
curve below 0.95. On the other hand, all the algorithms score
above 0.98 with the “sum” feature.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology incredibly evolved and revolutionized society
over the last decade. Sometimes technological breakthroughs
trigger the necessity for an update of existing tools. In the case
of Big Data, one of the obvious consequences is the necessity
for new storage devices, able to keep up with the data trend.
With its high capacity/volume ratio, DNA is among the
most interesting candidates for solving the storage issue.
(a) Area Under ROC curve.
(b) Area Under Precision-Recall curve.
Figure 9. Mean and standard deviation of the Area Under ROC curve and
Precision-Recall curve for different algorithms, calculated using a sampling
period of 10, 20, 30, 60, 120 and 240 seconds.
However, biological devices storing information in their DNA
can suffer of security issues ascribed to traditional electronic
architectures. A malicious user can use malicious bacteria
to replicate conventional attacks, such as DoS attacks, on a
bacterial nanonetworks. In order to mitigate these risks, we
need to deploy some countermeasures to prevent and detect
these new kind of threats. In this paper, we focus on two
different detection techniques: metrics and machine learning.
In particular, we adapt to our scenario metrics for detecting
traditional DoS attacks.
Applying some changes to the metrics defined by Xiang et
al [13], we manage to distinguish legitimate traffic from ma-
licious traffic. Moreover, we use machine learning algorithms
to perform binary classification using three different features,
in order to analyse the bacterial network traffic. Considering
the “sum” feature, we scored an AUROC over 0.99, and an
AUPRC over 0.91, proving that we can reliably distinguish
whether the system is under attack or not. We also showed
that - due to the nature of our data - K-NN is the worst
performing classification algorithm, while RF proved to be
most consistent, across different features.
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APPENDIX A
METRICS RESULTS
Figures 10 to 12 and Figures 13 to 15 show the results
we obtained by varying the order α for generalized entropy
and information distance. By increasing α, the generalized
entropy becomes less responsive to variations in the number of
malicious bacteria. On the other hand, the information distance
lacks of monotic behaviour, as we can see in by the spikes in
Figure 14 and Figure 15.
Figure 10. Impact of metric order on generalized entropy with sampling
period T = 10s and α = 0.5.
Figure 11. Impact of metric order on generalized entropy with sampling
period T = 10s and α = 5.
APPENDIX B
MACHINE LEARNING RESULTS
Figures 16 to 18 and Figures 19 to 21 illustrate the ROC
and Precision-Recall curve for each model, using a sample
period of 10 seconds. For each different model and feature,
we present the respective score in the legend of the graphs.
As previously discussed, we can see that the K-NN algorithm
is the one performing worst over different features.
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Figure 12. Impact of metric order on generalized entropy with sampling
period T = 10s and α = 10.
Figure 13. Impact of metric order on information distance with sampling
period T = 10s and α = 0.5.
Figure 14. Impact of metric order on information distance with sampling
period T = 10s and α = 5.
Figure 15. Impact of metric order on information distance with sampling
period T = 10s and α = 10.
Figure 16. ROC curve of different algorithms using the sample feature and
T = 10s as sampling period.
Figure 17. ROC curve of different algorithms using the count feature and
T = 10s as sampling period.
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Figure 18. ROC curve of different algorithms using the sum feature and
T = 10s as sampling period.
Figure 19. Precision-recall curve of different algorithms using the sample
feature and T = 10s as sampling period.
Figure 20. Precision-recall curve of different algorithms using the count
feature and T = 10s as sampling period.
Figure 21. Precision-recall curve of different algorithms using the sum feature
and T = 10s as sampling period.
